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		<title>10 Buffett-isms from 2005</title>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Apr 2008 14:05:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Robert</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Buffett-isms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2005 letter]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[benjamin franklin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[berkshire hathaway]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[widening the moat]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[
The following list contains the 10 most important pieces of wisdom and information from Warren Buffett&#8217;s 2005 letter to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.  I have also posted the most important &#8220;Buffett-isms&#8221; from his 2006 and 2007 letters.  I highly recommend that you read those posts. 
If you’ve never read one of these letters, you should [...]]]></description>
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<div class="KonaBody">The following list contains the 10 most important pieces of wisdom and information from Warren Buffett&#8217;s 2005 letter to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.  I have also posted the most important &#8220;Buffett-isms&#8221; from his <a title="2006" href="http://flimjo.com/14-buffett-isms-from-2006/" target="_blank">2006</a> and <a title="2007" href="http://flimjo.com/buffett-isms-the-wisdom-of-warren-buffett/" target="_blank">2007</a> letters.  I highly recommend that you read those posts. </div>
<div class="KonaBody">If you’ve never read one of these letters, you should make it a priority.  They are often short (this 2005 letter is just 23 pages long).  It takes about 30 minutes to read, but the information you gain is priceless.  Each of the letters, dating back to 1977, is available on the <a title="Berkshire Hathaway" href="http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/letters.html" target="_blank">Berkshire Hathaway</a> website in PDF form free of charge.</div>
<div class="KonaBody">
<p>As I have done previously, the words within quotes are Buffett’s words; the words not in quotes that follow each item&#8211;if any–-are my humbled analyses.</p>
<p>1) <em>On his decision to wait several years to sell a failing insurance company</em>: &#8220;When a problem exists, whether in personnel or in business operations, the time to act is <em>now</em>.&#8221;</p>
<p>Hesitation can be a tragic non-decision.  Too often, as investors and in life, we wait and wait, hoping that a bad course of events will reverse itself.  But the best way to correct a problem is to tackle it right away.  Cut your losses while you can.  <em> </em></p>
<p>2) &#8220;When our long-term competitive position improves as a result of [delighting customers, eliminating unnecessary costs, and improving our products and services], we describe the phenomenon as &#8220;widening the moat.&#8221;  And doing that is essential if we are to have the kind of business we want a decade or two from now.  We always, of course, hope to earn more money in the short-term.  But when short-term and long-term conflict, widening the moat <em>must</em> take precedence.&#8221;</p>
<p>A business that isn&#8217;t built for the long-term inevitably fails.  The problem with planning for the long-term is that it involves non-sexy things like &#8220;eliminating unnecessary costs&#8221; and &#8220;improving . . . services.&#8221;  These tasks build your brand and help establish an identity for your business, and those intangibles are what last longer than any product you sell. </p>
<p>3) <em>More on widening the moat</em>: &#8220;If a management makes bad decisions in order to hit short-term earnings targets, and consequently gets behind the eight-ball in terms of costs, customer satisfaction or brand strength, no amount of subsequent brilliance will overcome the damage that has been inflicted.  Take a look at the dilemmas of managers in the auto and airline industries today as they struggle with the huge problems handed them by their predecessors.  Charlie is fond of Ben Franklin&#8217;s &#8220;An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.&#8221;  But sometimes no amount of cure will overcome the mistakes of the past.&#8221;</p>
<p>Quoting Benjamin Franklin makes it as clear as it can be.</p>
<p>4) &#8220;[E]xecutive compensation in the U.S. is ridiculously out of line with performance.  That won&#8217;t change, moreover, because the deck is stacked against investors when it comes to the CEO&#8217;s pay.  The upshot is that a mediocre-or-worse CEO&#8211;aided by his handpicked VP of human relations and a consultant from the ever-accommodating firm of Ratchet, Ratchet and Bingo&#8211;all too often receives gobs of money from an ill-designed compensation arrangement.&#8221;</p>
<p>I love Buffett railing against the insane executive compensation we see today.  Most of it, as he points out, is so out of line with the performances of these companies.  It doesn&#8217;t make sense, and it seems to rob investors of their money and trust.<img class="alignright" style="float: right;" src="http://www.ordinaryinvesting.com/graphics/hand.jpg" alt="" width="261" height="274" /></p>
<p>5) &#8220;Getting fired can produce a particularly bountiful payday for a CEO.  Indeed, he can &#8220;earn&#8221; more in that single day, while cleaning out his desk, than an American worker earns in a lifetime of cleaning toilets.  Forget the old maxim about nothing succeeding like success: Today, in the executive suite, the all-too-prevalent rule is that nothing succeeds like <em>failure</em>.&#8221;</p>
<p>We have seen this phenomenon all too often in corporate America.</p>
<p>6) &#8220;The U.S. . . . is extraordinarily rich and will get richer.  As a result, the huge imbalances in its current account may continue for a long time without their having noticeable deleterious effects on the U.S. economy or on markets.  I doubt, however, that the situation will forever remain benign.  Either Americans address the problem soon in a way we select, or at some point the problem will likely address us in an unpleasant way of its own.&#8221;</p>
<p>Has this prophecy come to fruition already.  Buffett wrote these words in early 2006.  The state of our economy today and the &#8220;imbalances&#8221; of our trade deficit seem to be &#8220;address[ing] us in an unpleasant way&#8221; already. </p>
<p>7) <em>On shareholders minimizing the returns on their investments</em>: &#8220;[T]he most that owners in aggregate can earn between now and Judgment Day is what their businesses in aggregate earn.  True, by buying and selling that is clever or lucky, investor A may take more than his share of the pie at the expense of investor B.  And, yes, all investors <em>feel</em> richer when stocks soar.  But an owner can exit only by having someone take his place.  If one investor sells high, another must buy high.  For owners as a whole, there is simply no magic&#8211;no shower of money from outer space&#8211;that will enable them to extract wealth from their companies beyond that created by the companies themselves.&#8221;</p>
<p>This paragraph is a great, concise explanation of markets and supply and demand.  Investing in stocks isn&#8217;t about buying low and selling high, as the large majority of individuals&#8211;who think they&#8217;re stock investors&#8211;try to do.  The &#8220;buy, hold, and pray&#8221; mentality is a recipe for disaster.  Investing in stocks is about investing in companies, and the return on your investment is directly tied to the wealth those companies create.  Thus, when you invest, it is crucial that you understand what kind of company or business you are investing in and how financially sound it is.</p>
<p>8) <em>On the fact that a record portion of a company&#8217;s earnings that would normally go to owners now goes to an army of &#8220;Helpers,&#8221; or a bureaucratic system of brokers, managers, financial planners, and consultants</em>: &#8220;[T]he burden of paying Helpers may cause American equity investors, overall, to earn only 80% or so of what they would earn if they just sat still and listened to no one.&#8221;</p>
<p>This is a fantastic comment on the price of bureaucracy. </p>
<p>9) <em>More on the problem with Helpers</em>: &#8220;Long ago, Sir Isaac Newton gave us three laws of motion, which were the work of genius.  But Sir Isaac&#8217;s talents didn&#8217;t extend to investing: He lost a bundle in the South Sea Bubble, explaining later, &#8216;I can calculate the movement of the stars, but not the madness of men.&#8217;  If he had not been traumatized by this loss, Sir Isaac might well have gone on to discover the Fourth Law of Motion: <em>For investors as a whole, returns decrease as motion increases</em>.&#8221;</p>
<p>10) &#8220;[T]he Dow increased from 65.73 to 11,497.12 in the 20th century, and that amounts to a gain of 5.3% compounded annually.  (Investors would also have received dividends, of course.)  To achieve an equal rate of gain in the 21st century, the Dow will have to rise by December 31, 2099 to&#8211;brace yourself&#8211;precisely 2,011,011.23.  But I&#8217;m willing to settle for 2,000,000; six years into this century, the Dow has gained not at all.&#8221;</p>
<p>Can the Dow&#8211;and the wealth of American companies&#8211;increase at the same rate again?  Is this 2,000,000 mark achievable?</p>
<p>If you like this post, please consider subscribing to my <a title="full RSS feed" href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/flimjo/HMUC" target="_blank">full RSS feed</a>.  You can also subscribe by e-mail.</p>
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		<title>14 Buffett-isms From 2006</title>
		<link>http://flimjo.com/14-buffett-isms-from-2006/</link>
		<comments>http://flimjo.com/14-buffett-isms-from-2006/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 31 Mar 2008 10:31:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Robert</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Buffett-isms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2006]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[berkshire hathaway]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[board of directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[buffett]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[financial education]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://flimjo.com/?p=84</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[After reading Warren Buffett’s 2007 letter to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. and posting the 11 most important pieces of wisdom from that letter, I decided to read every single one of his previous letters and do the same thing.  If you’ve never read one of these letters, I highly recommend it.  They are [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style='float:left'><br><iframe src='http://digg.com/api/diggthis.php?u=http://flimjo.com/14-buffett-isms-from-2006/' height='82' width='55' frameborder='0' scrolling='no'></iframe></div><div class="KonaBody">After reading Warren Buffett’s 2007 letter to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. and posting the <a title="11 most important pieces of wisdom" href="http://flimjo.com/buffett-isms-the-wisdom-of-warren-buffett/" target="_blank">11 most important pieces of wisdom</a> from that letter, I decided to read every single one of his previous letters and do the same thing.  If you’ve never read one of these letters, I highly recommend it.  They are often short (the 2006 letter is just 24 pages long).  It takes about 30 minutes to read, but the information you gain is priceless.  Each of the letters, dating back to 1977, is available on the <a title="Berkshire Hathaway" href="http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/letters.html" target="_blank"><span style="color: #17a034;">Berkshire Hathaway</span></a> website in PDF form free of charge.</p>
<p>Like I did with Buffett’s 2007 letter, I picked out the most important things in his 2006 letter and listed them below.  As I did previously, the words within quotes are Buffett’s words; the words not in quotes that follow each item–if any–are my humbled analyses.</p>
<p>1) <em>The thoughts of Buffett and Charlie Munger (his partner and Berkshire&#8217;s vice chairman) on big businesses</em>: &#8220;We both grew skeptical about the ability of big entities of any type to function well.  Size seems to make many organizations slow-thinking, resistant to change and smug.  In Churchill&#8217;s words: &#8216;We shape our buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape us.&#8217;&#8221;</p>
<p>Is there any way to stop this?  Is there any way to prevent our creations from dictating our actions?</p>
<p>2) <em>On their insurance holdings</em>: &#8220;Don&#8217;t think . . . that we have lost our taste for risk.  We remain prepared to lose $6 billion in a single event, <em>if</em> we have been paid appropriately for assuming that risk.  We are not willing, though, to take on even very small exposures at prices that don&#8217;t reflect our evaluation of loss probabilities.  Appropriate prices don&#8217;t guarantee profits in any given year, but inappropriate prices most certainly guarantee eventual losses. . . . Our behavior . . . parallels that which we employ in financial markets: Be fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when others are fearful.&#8221;</p>
<p>That last line&#8211;&#8221;Be fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when others are fearful&#8221;&#8211;can be applied in any context.  When everyone was buying real estate and jumping into this &#8220;flipping&#8221; epidemic, you could smell the greed that permeated those actions.  Any smart individual would have feared jumping into the same pool.  Now, however, when everyone is fearful of buying any real estate whatsoever, the smart investor is greedy . . . greedy for the opportunities that abound.</p>
<p>The same is true of the tech boom in the late 1990s.  When everyone was buying tech stocks, you could feel the greed in the air.  Tech stock prices were at all-time highs, and, yet, people kept buying.  The smart investor sat back, fearful of such speculation.  Then, when those stock prices plummeted, and investors became fearful of selling, and outsiders were fearful of jumping into the market, the smart investor became greedy . . . greedy for the bargains that were plentiful.</p>
<p>3) <em>On the decline of the newspaper industry</em>: &#8220;When an industry&#8217;s underlying economics are crumbling, talented management may slow the rate of decline.  Eventually, though, eroding fundamentals will overwhelm managerial brilliance.  (As a wise friend told me long ago, &#8216;If you want to get a reputation as a good businessman, be sure to get into a good business.&#8217;)  And fundamentals are definitely eroding in the newspaper industry . . . .  The skid will almost certainly continue.&#8221;</p>
<p>4) <em>More on the newspaper industry</em>: &#8220;[A]lmost all newspaper owners realize that they are constantly losing ground in the battle for eyeballs.  Simply put, if cable and satellite broadcasting, as well as the internet, had come along first, newspapers as we know them probably would never have existed.&#8221;</p>
<p>5) <em>On newspaper ownership</em>: &#8220;We are likely . . . to see non-economic individual buyers of newspapers emerge, just as we have seen such buyers acquire major sports franchises.  Aspiring press lords should be careful, however: There&#8217;s no rule that says a newspaper&#8217;s revenues can&#8217;t fall below its expenses and that losses can&#8217;t mushroom. . . . As the importance of newspapers diminishes . . . the &#8216;psychic&#8217; value of possessing one will wane, whereas owning a sports franchise will likely retain its cachet.&#8221;</p>
<p>Who would have ever thought that owning a sports franchise would be more profitable than owning a newspaper?</p>
<p>6) <em>On the real estate bubble</em>: &#8220;The slowdown in residential real estate activity stems in part from the weakened lending practices of recent years.  The &#8216;optional&#8217; contracts and &#8216;teaser&#8217; rates that have been popular have allowed borrowers to make payments in the early years of their mortgages that fall far short of covering normal interest costs.  Naturally, there are few defaults when virtually nothing is required of a borrower.  As a cynic has said, &#8216;A rolling loan gathers no loss.&#8217;  But payments <em>not</em> made add to principal, and borrowers who can&#8217;t afford normal monthly payments early on are hit later with <em>above-normal</em> monthly obligations.  This is the Scarlett O&#8217;Hara scenario: &#8216;I&#8217;ll think about that tomorrow.&#8217;  For many home owners, &#8216;tomorrow&#8217; has arrived.&#8221;</p>
<p>When I read the Scarlett O&#8217;Hara quote, I tried desperately to remember when, in the movie <a title="Gone With The Wind" href="http://www.bizrate.com/dvds_videos/gone-with-the-wind-1939---pid718578584/index__af_assettype_id--4__af_creative_id--4__af_id--3765__af_placement_id--1__cat_id--51__prod_id--718578584__rf--af1/compareprices.html" target="_blank">Gone With The Wind</a>, she said that.  I could not remember . . . probably because I never liked that movie at all.  But this concept is very important.  We can only put off so much until tomorrow.  We can only procrastinate so much.  Eventually, &#8220;tomorrow&#8221; will arrive, and our obligations will come to fruition.</p>
<p>7) <em>On U.S. trade problems and the weakening dollar</em>: &#8220;[T]he U.S. had $.76 trillion of <em>pseudo</em>-trade last year&#8211;imports for which we exchanged no goods or services.  (Ponder, for a moment, how commentators would describe the situation if our imports were $.76 trillion&#8211;a full 6% of GDP&#8211;and we had <em>no</em>exports.)  Making these purchases that weren&#8217;t reciprocated by sales, the U.S. necessarily transferred ownership of its assets or IOUs to the rest of the world.  Like a very wealthy but self-indulgent family, we peeled off a bit of what we owned in order to consume more than we produced.&#8221;</p>
<p>8) <em>More on U.S. spending problems</em>: &#8220;Foreigners now earn more on their U.S. investments than we do on our investments abroad.  In effect, we&#8217;ve used up our bank account and turned to our credit card.  And, like everyone who gets in hock, the U.S. will now experience &#8216;reverse compounding&#8217; as we pay ever-increasing amounts of interest on interest.&#8221;</p>
<p>I can&#8217;t think of a better analogy to summarize America&#8217;s financial problems.  The U.S. has &#8220;turned to our credit card.&#8221;  Any understanding of how reliance on credits dooms an individual should inform us, generally, about where we are headed financially as a country.</p>
<p>9) <em>Some bittersweet optimism about the future</em>: &#8220;[E]ven though our course is unwise, Americans will live better ten or twenty years from now than they do today. . . . But our citizens will also be forced every year to ship a significant portion of their current production abroad merely to service the cost of our huge debtor position.  It won&#8217;t be pleasant to work part of each day to pay for the over-consumption of your ancestors. . . . [A]t some point in the future U.S. workers and voters will find this annual &#8216;tribute&#8217; so onerous that there will be a severe political backlash.  How that will play out in markets is impossible to predict&#8211;but to expect a &#8217;soft landing&#8217; seems like wishful thinking.&#8221;</p>
<p>This is an amazing prophecy . . . and one that will, indeed, occur.  It may not be for another 10 or 20 years, but these words will resonate for years to come. </p>
<p>10) &#8220;Independent thinking, emotional stability, and a keen understanding of both human and institutional behavior is vital to long-term investment success.  I&#8217;ve seen a lot of very smart people who have lacked these virtues.&#8221;</p>
<p>11) &#8220;In selecting a new director, we were guided by our long-standing criteria, which are that board members be owner-oriented, business-savvy, interested and truly independent.&#8221;</p>
<p>12) &#8220;[O]ur four criteria are essential if directors are to do their job&#8211;which, by law, is to faithfully represent <em>owners</em>.  Yet these criteria are usually ignored.  Instead, consultants and CEOs seeking board candidates will often say, &#8216;We&#8217;re looking for a woman,&#8217; or &#8216;a Hispanic,&#8217; or &#8217;someone from abroad,&#8217; or what have you.  It sometimes sounds as if the mission is to stock Noah&#8217;s ark.  Over the years I&#8217;ve been queried many times about potential directors and have yet to hear <em>anyone</em> ask, &#8216;Does he think like an intelligent owner?&#8217;&#8221;</p>
<p>Knowing Warren Buffett&#8217;s political orientation, I was surprised&#8211;in this statement&#8211;to see him eschew political contrivances in favor of sound business principles.  Then again, why am I surprised?  Any businessman who elevates politics above sound financial principles would not be anywhere near as successful as Buffett. </p>
<p>13) &#8220;In 2006 . . . . [a] flood of money went from institutional investors to the 2-and-20 crowd.  For those innocent of this arrangement, let me explain: It&#8217;s a lopsided system whereby 2% of your <em>principal</em> is paid each year to the manager even if he accomplishes nothing&#8211;or, for that matter, loses you a bundle&#8211;and, additionally, 20% of your profit is paid to him if he succeeds, even if his success is due simply to a rising tide.  For example, a manager who achieves a gross return of 10% in a year will keep 3.6 percentage points&#8211;two points off the top plus 20% of the residual 8 points&#8211;leaving only 6.4 percentage points for his investors.  On a $3 billion fund, this 6.4% net &#8216;performance&#8217; will deliver the manager a cool $108 million.  He will receive this bonanza even though an index fund might have returned 15% to investors in the same period and charged them only a token fee.&#8221;</p>
<p>Is this an endorsement of index funds?  I think so.  Read my post about the <a title="superiority of index funds to mutual funds" href="http://flimjo.com/the-best-mutual-fund-is-an-index-fund/" target="_blank">superiority of index funds to mutual funds</a>.</p>
<p>14) &#8220;When someone with experience proposes a deal to someone with money, too often the fellow with money ends up with the experience, and the fellow with experience ends up with the money.&#8221;</p>
<p>I can&#8217;t think of a better way to emphasize that each person should focus on his or her own financial education and not rely on the supposed wisdom or experience of others.</p>
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		<title>11 Buffett-isms from 2007</title>
		<link>http://flimjo.com/buffett-isms-the-wisdom-of-warren-buffett/</link>
		<comments>http://flimjo.com/buffett-isms-the-wisdom-of-warren-buffett/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 10 Mar 2008 11:30:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Robert</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Buffett-isms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2006]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://flimjo.com/?p=60</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I recently read Warren Buffett&#8217;s 2007 letter to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.  If you&#8217;ve never read one of these letters, I highly recommend it.  They are often short (the 2007 letter is just 20 pages long).  It takes about 30 minutes to read it, but the information you gain is priceless.  Each of the letters, [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style='float:left'><br><iframe src='http://digg.com/api/diggthis.php?u=http://flimjo.com/buffett-isms-the-wisdom-of-warren-buffett/' height='82' width='55' frameborder='0' scrolling='no'></iframe></div><div class="KonaBody">I recently read Warren Buffett&#8217;s 2007 letter to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.  If you&#8217;ve never read one of these letters, I highly recommend it.  They are often short (the 2007 letter is just 20 pages long).  It takes about 30 minutes to read it, but the information you gain is priceless.  Each of the letters, dating back to 1977, is available on the <a target="_blank" href="http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/letters.html" title="Berkshire Hathaway">Berkshire Hathaway</a> website in PDF form free of charge.</p>
<p>If you can&#8217;t or haven&#8217;t read Buffett&#8217;s 2007 letter, I picked out the ten most important things in that letter and listed them below.  Well, ten wasn&#8217;t enough.  I tried to keep it within ten, but I had to add one more quote because I couldn&#8217;t leave #11 out.  (The words within quotes are Buffett&#8217;s words; the words not in quotes that follow each item&#8211;if any&#8211;are my humbled analyses.)    </p>
<p>1) <em>On what types of businesses Buffett and his partner, Charlie Munger, like to buy</em>: &#8220;Charlie and I look for companies that have a) a business we understand; b) favorable long-term economics; c) able and trustworthy management; and d) a sensible price tag.&#8221;</p>
<p>Most of these quotes don&#8217;t need commentary, nor dare I add anything to them because I am still just an employee.  But this one requires some additional clarification.  This particular advice (#1) is essential for anyone who invests in stocks and mutual funds.  If you want to buy stocks, you should know and understand the business of the company whose shares you are buying.  That company should be in good, long-term economic shape.  It should have good, experienced management, and the stock should not be overvalued.  Today, many people invest in stocks using the &#8220;buy, hold, and pray&#8221; strategy.  They are passive investors with no knowledge of the companies in which they are investing.   </p>
<p>2) &#8220;A truly great business must have an enduring &#8217;moat&#8217; that protects excellent returns on invested capital. . . . [C]apitalism guarantee[s] that competitors will repeatedly assault any business &#8216;castle&#8217; that is earning high returns.  Therefore a formidable barrier such as a company&#8217;s being the low-cost producer (GEICO, Costco) or possessing a powerful world-wide brand (Coca-Cola, Gillette, American Express) is essential for sustained success.  Business history is filled with &#8216;Roman Candles,&#8217; companies whose moats proved illusory and were soon crossed.&#8221; </p>
<p>3) &#8220;[I]f a business <em>requires </em>a superstar to produce great results, the business itself cannot be deemed great.  A medical partnership led by your area&#8217;s premier brain surgeon may enjoy outsized and growing earnings, but that tells little about its future.  The partnership&#8217;s moat will go when the surgeon goes.  You can count, though, on the moat of the Mayo Clinic to endure, even though you can&#8217;t name its CEO.&#8221;</p>
<p>This point is a fantastic lesson.  A successful business is about a product, not a person.  That is why your dad can&#8217;t sell his law practice.  That is why the owners of the mom-and-pop restaurant down the street aren&#8217;t millionaires.  To build a truly successful business, you have to create a product that becomes a well-known brand.  That way, when the original founder of that business exits the picture, the business itself&#8211;buoyed by its well-known product&#8211;remains vibrant and successful.</p>
<p>4) &#8220;There&#8217;s no rule that you have to invest money where you&#8217;ve earned it.  Indeed, it&#8217;s often a mistake to do so: Truly great businesses, earning huge returns on tangible assets, <em>can&#8217;t</em> for any extended period reinvest a large portion of their earnings internally at high rates of return.&#8221;</p>
<p>5) &#8220;It&#8217;s far better to have an ever-increasing stream of earnings with virtually no major capital requirements.  Ask Microsoft or Google.&#8221;</p>
<p>This is crucial, and the Internet has helped this phenomenon become a reality.  When a business can sell more of its brand (like software) without spending a correspondingly large amount of money developing more of that brand, it will increase its earnings exponentially.</p>
<p>6) &#8220;The worst sort of business is one that grows rapidly, requires significant capital to engender growth, and then earns little or no money.  Think airlines.  Here a <em>durable</em> competitive advantage has proved elusive ever since the days of the Wright Brothers.  Indeed, if a farsighted capitalist had been present at Kitty Hawk, he would have done his successors a huge favor by shooting Orville down.  The airline industry&#8217;s demand for capital ever since that first flight has been insatiable.  Investors poured money into a bottomless pit, attracted by growth when they should have been repelled by it.&#8221;</p>
<p>Is it any surprise that most of the airlines couldn&#8217;t survive the 9/11 terrorist attacks? </p>
<p>7) <em>On Berkshire&#8217;s common stock investments</em>: &#8220;American Express and Wells Fargo were both organized by Henry Wells and William Fargo, Amex in 1850 and Wells in 1852.  P&amp;G and Coke began business in 1837 and 1886 respectively.  Start-ups are not our game.&#8221;</p>
<p>This quote, more than any of the others, illustrates that investing is about a plan.  Buffett, like every successful investor, has a plan, and he never deviates from it.  That is what investing should be.  Decide on your plan, and stick to it.  If you want to invest in real estate, go for it.  But don&#8217;t opt for stocks six months later.  Stick to your plan. </p>
<p>8) &#8221;The U.S. dollar weakened further in 2007 against major currencies, and it&#8217;s no mystery why: Americans like buying products made elsewhere more than the rest of the world likes buying products made in the U.S.  Inevitably, that causes Americans to ship about $2 billion of IOUs and assets <em>daily</em> to the rest of the world.  And over time, that puts pressure on the dollar.&#8221;</p>
<p>9) &#8220;Despite our country&#8217;s many imperfections and unrelenting problems of one sort or another, America&#8217;s rule of law, market-responsive economic system, and belief in meritocracy are almost certain to produce ever-growing prosperity for its citizens.&#8221;</p>
<p>This positive outlook is a breath of fresh air in the midst of the prevailing gloom and doom perspectives we hear about the U.S. economy on a daily basis.  I only hope that Buffett is right about this one. </p>
<p>10) &#8220;[P]eople who expect to earn 10% annually from equities during this century . . . are implicitly forecasting a level of about <em>24,000,000</em> on the Dow by 2100.  If your adviser talks to you about double-digit returns from equities, explain this math to him&#8211;not that it will faze him.  Many helpers are apparently direct descendants of the queen in Alice in Wonderland, who said: &#8216;Why, sometimes I&#8217;ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.&#8217;  Beware the glib helper who fills your head with fantasies while he fills his pockets with fees.&#8221;</p>
<p>Look at it this way: Why would a high-salaried executive or a rich individual, both of whom have their own transportation to get to work, take the advice of a person (a financial adviser) who takes the subway to work?</p>
<p>11) &#8220;Public pension promises are huge and, in many cases, funding is woefully inadequate.  Because the fuse on this time bomb is long, politicians flinch from inflicting tax pain, given that problems will only become apparent long after these officials have departed. . . . In a world where people are living longer and inflation is certain, those promises will be anything but easy to keep.&#8221;</p>
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